Abstract Analyzing a homogenous household setting with endogenous fertility and endogenous labor supply, we demonstrate that moving from joint taxation to individual taxation and adapting child benefits so as to keep fertility constant entails a Pareto improvement. The change is associated with an increase in labor supply and consumption and a reduction of the marginal income tax, while the child benefit may move in either direction. Similarly, a move from joint taxation to some scheme of family tax splitting increases labor supply and welfare.
Introduction
The taxation of couples and families has undergone substantial changes in the last decades. Among the major economies, joint taxation is still in place in the USA and in Germany. At the same time, there is an obvious international trend to move from joint taxation to individual taxation with or without additional child benefits. Joint taxation is perceived as an obstacle against increasing labor supply of wives because marginal tax rates are higher than under individual taxation. In a progressive income tax scheme with rising marginal tax rates, joint taxation yields tax savings when income of the spouses is distributed in an uneven fashion. At the same time, the marginal tax rate related to the smaller income will be higher than under individual taxation to generate a fixed tax revenue per capita. Moreover, joint taxation is not very precise as a means to encourage fertility, as all possible tax savings are independent of the number of children. Nevertheless, when mothers have to reduce labor supply at least temporarily, joint taxation reduces the opportunity cost associated with foregone labor income.
In this paper, we argue that joint taxation is not efficient. A Pareto improvement can be achieved by moving to individual taxation, accompanied by appropriate child benefits. The argument runs as follows: Joint taxation distorts the decisions of individuals stronger than individual taxation. When moving from individual taxation to joint taxation, substitution effects drive labor supply down and fertility up. Replacing joint taxation with individual taxation to arrive at the same budget deficit per capita will be associated with an increased labor supply and a smaller marginal income tax. Applying the Pareto criterion requires that we compare allocations where all individuals exist in either allocation. The idea therefore is to adapt a child benefit when moving from joint taxation to individual taxation so as to keep fertility constant. Since the distortion of labor supply is reduced, the reform toward individual taxation raises welfare. Applying the same method to a move from joint taxation to some scheme of family tax splitting also yields a Pareto improvement via an increasing labor supply.
Our main contribution consists in extending the efficiency argument against joint taxation to a framework of endogenous fertility, thus acknowledging the function of household taxation as an instrument of family policy. As a second novelty, we show that the standard method of joint taxation is also inferior to family tax splitting. In principle, it does not make sense to introduce a child benefit when income taxation already distorts the fertility decision upward. This may be different in an environment with positive externalities of having children. For example, positive externalities of fertility exist if a pay-as-you-go scheme is present where the return to social security contributions rises with a higher number of individuals in the following generation (see Cigno et al. 2003) .
The literature on the taxation of couples has mainly treated fertility as exogenous. Since the seminal paper of Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) , the vast majority of the literature has perceived joint taxation as inferior to individual taxation from an efficiency perspective. This message can clearly be traced back to the principle of Ramsey taxation stating that taxes should be the lowest where labor supply elasticities are particularly high, that is, for married women. Accordingly, Apps and Rees (2011) argue that both joint taxation and individual taxation are inferior to selective taxation where female labor income is taxed at lower marginal rates than the wages of males. While joint taxation eliminates possible distortions of the technical rates of substitution between household and market production (Piggott and Whalley 1996) , joint taxation never constitutes the optimal policy because Ramsey taxation requires to distort all activities (Apps and Rees 1999) . It cannot even be excluded that the optimum tax regime requires a smaller marginal tax on the income of the primary earner (Kleven and Kreiner 2007) . Optimum taxation models of the Mirrlees type with two-person households indicate that joint taxation with identical marginal tax rates will generally not be part of the optimum tax schedule (Brett 2007) . In Kleven et al. (2009) , the optimal marginal tax of one individual decreases in the income of the other individual. This property of negative jointness is not satisfied in real-world income tax schemes, neither with individual nor with joint taxation, but it frequently holds when means-tested benefits are taken into account (Immervoll et al. 2011) . Different outcomes are obtained if labor supply decisions are taken in a noncooperative fashion. High marginal tax rates for secondary earners under joint taxation can then correct negative externalities if higher labor supply implies a reduction in the production of a household public good (Meier and Rainer 2010) .
The empirical literature on reforms aiming at changing the taxation of couples seems inconclusive. Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) , considering a possible move in the USA from joint taxation to reduced tax rates for married women, find strong labor supply increases of these women that contribute substantially to financing the tax cut. On the other hand, Beblo et al. (2004) and Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) , analyzing moves from joint income taxation to different specifications of family tax splitting, estimate comparatively low labor supply elasticities, implying that such reforms have mainly distributional impacts.
Another strand of the literature is concerned with the impacts of alternative policy instruments on fertility and female labor supply. Apps and Rees (2004) show that introducing a subsidy for purchased child care financed by a reduction of family allowances will increase both fertility and female labor supply. Furthermore, increasing the male tax rate and reducing the female tax rate so as to keep total tax revenue constant always increases labor supply, while the impact on fertility depends both on the weight of fertility in the utility function and on the elasticity of substitution between different types of child care. Although the price of a child increases due to a higher opportunity cost, fertility may increase due to an income effect if the female labor supply reaction is strong. Cigno (1983 Cigno ( , 1986 argues that the government would like to accompany child subsidies by taxes on adult consumption to avoid a smaller investment in child quality when fertility increases.
In other settings, a distributional objective of the government determines the tax policy. Cremer et al. (2003) obtain optimal marginal tax rates decreasing in the number of children in an optimal taxation problem where the government can observe the number of children and total income, but not working hours. Balestrino (2001) considers a rich set of instruments with a wage tax, a tax (or subsidy) on the number of children, and indirect taxes referring to consumption goods of children and adults. With identical wages across households, all goods, including children, will be taxed according to a Ramsey rule to achieve symmetric distortions of decisions. Imposing the usual structure of preference for the quantity and quality of children, distributional considerations lead the government to subsidize the number of children and to tax child consumption in order to redistribute toward poor families. However, if demand for consuming child-specific commodities decreases with a higher wage rate of the mother, the size of the family will be taxed while childspecific commodities are subsidized (Balestrino et al. 2002; Cigno and Pettini 2002) .
Finally, Fraser (2001) considers parents who reduce fertility as a response to income risk. Employing child benefits instead of lump-sum benefits can then bring about a Pareto improvement by encouraging an increase in fertility. While he does not address the choice of the tax regime, this line of reasoning indicates that joint taxation provides some additional insurance against losses from unemployment and may thus increase fertility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our model. In Section 3, we analyze the consequences of moving from joint to individual taxation with adapting policy instruments so as to keep both fertility and the government budget balanced. Section 4 deals with a similar move from joint taxation to family tax splitting, and the final Section 5 discusses our main findings.
The model
Consider a homogenous population of couples where the utility function U(c, n, l) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in its arguments consumption c, the number of children n and leisure of the wife l. We neglect the integer constraint on the number of children. There are three uses of time, namely work, leisure, and time spent with children. Total time is normalized to unity, and raising one child requires k units of time and p units of the consumption good. The child benefit is equal to β. Each household has an exogenous income y 0 that is earned by the husband. This assumption reflects the finding of the empirical literature that labor supply elasticities of husbands in their prime age are generally very close to zero (Pencavel 1986; Evers et al. 2008) , confirming the standard prediction of the literature that husbands tend to specialize in market work (Cigno 2009 ). The wife's wage rate is w, and the income tax T depends on the two earned incomes. Hence, the household's budget equation is
( 1) where
is the wife's income. For the sake of concreteness, we assume that the wife is the secondary earner: y 0 ≥ w . The government provides g units of a public or private good per household, where the level is fixed. This good does not enter the utility function explicitly. The government uses a progressive tax function φ(y; t), with φ 1 > 0, φ 2 > 0, φ 11 ≥ 0, and φ 12 > 0, where y denotes income of the taxable unit, t is a tax parameter, and the index i ∈ {1, 2} denotes the derivative with respect to the ith argument. The marginal tax rate is increasing weakly. However, in order to make the analysis meaningful, we assume that the marginal tax rate increases somewhere in the relevant range, that is, φ 1 ((y 0 + y 1 )/2) > φ 1 (y 1 ) at any y 1 < y 0 . Raising the tax parameter t shifts all marginal tax rates upward, where our analysis remains general with respect to the mode of how this is done, for example, additively or multiplicatively. The total tax that has to be paid by a couple with individual incomes y 0 and y 1 is
This specification contains the pure joint taxation scheme as the boundary case α = 0 and the pure individual taxation scheme at the other boundary α = 1. The budget equation of the government is
with g denoting public expenditure per household. For simplicity, public expenditure g is kept constant throughout and does not enter household utility explicitly. Taking public good consumption into account would just complicate the notation somewhat without affecting any result. After inserting its budget constraint, the household chooses the number of children n and leisure l so as to maximize utility
Since the budget set is convex, we arrive at a unique solution to the optimization problem of the household. The first-order conditions are
where
is the marginal net price of leisure,
is the marginal net price of a child, and
is the marginal tax rate of the household. Having an additional child increases utility directly by U n . At the same time, it reduces consumption according to the direct cost p net of the child allowance β, the gross opportunity cost kw, and the possible change of the income tax −wk ∂ T/∂ y 1 . Increasing the demand for leisure by one unit directly raises utility by U l but reduces consumption according to the loss in net income given by w(1 − ∂ T/∂ y 1 ).
We only consider situations with a positive net price of a child because otherwise a solution to the optimization problem does not exist. Further, we impose the regularity assumptions U cc ψ − U cl < 0 and U ll − U cl ψ < 0; that is, increasing labor supply and using the additional net wage income for consumption decreases the marginal utility of consumption and increases the marginal utility of leisure. Obviously, these regularity conditions are fulfilled for additive-separable utility functions. We also assume that the sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied, that is, V nn < 0, V ll < 0, and
Tax policy analysis
The first-order conditions implicitly define the number of children n and leisure l as functions of the three policy parameters, the tax structure parameter α, the child benefit β, and the tax rate parameter t:
We proceed by analyzing a change in the tax structure parameter α when the child benefit β and the tax rate parameter t are altered so as to stabilize the number of children per household, n, and the public budget. The sequence of events runs as follows: First, the government sets the policy parameters α, β, and t. Afterward, many identical households choose n and l. Therefore, each mother has the same number of children, and each household pays the same amount of taxes net of child benefits. Changing the tax structure parameter α affects child benefits as well as marginal and average tax rates. Hence, we determine dβ/dα and dt/dα from n(β, t; α) −n = 0,
where we slightly abuse notation by using again the symbol T.
Let the dynamic evolution of the child benefit and the tax rate parameter be governed by the following system of differential equations:
with f 1 (0) = f 2 (0) = 0, f 1 < 0, and f 2 < 0. Hence, the child benefit is increased if fertility falls short of the target leveln and vice versa. Similarly, the tax rate parameter is raised when the government runs a budget deficit, while tax rates will fall if we have a budget surplus. An equilibrium of this dynamic system is locally asymptotically stable only if at the equilibrium point the two conditions ∂β/∂β + ∂ṫ/∂t ≤ 0 and ∂β/∂β ∂ṫ/∂t − ∂β/∂t ∂ṫ/∂β = f 1 f 2 2 ≥ 0 are met, with
For simplicity, we assume in the following that the sufficient stability condition is satisfied; that is, we have strict inequalities in each case. As usual, comparative static analyses would be meaningless if the stability conditions are not met because the postulated adjustment processes would not converge to the equilibrium in that case. Proposition 1 summarizes the impacts of increasing the share of individual taxation on the household demand structure and the policy parameters of the government.
Proposition 1 Any increase of the share of individual taxation α with additional changes in the child benef it β and the tax rate parameter t so as to keep fertility constant and the government budget balanced reduces demand for leisure and increases both labor supply and demand for consumption goods. The child benef it parameter β can move in either direction. The marginal tax rate of the household at the new equilibrium will be lower.
Proof See Appendix A in electronic supplementary material.
The result can be interpreted as follows: In a first step, shifting the tax scheme toward individual taxation reduces the marginal tax rate. Therefore, both the price of leisure and the price of a child go up through the higher opportunity cost. At the same time, the tax rate parameter is adapted in such a way that the total net tax the household pays stays constant if all households behave symmetrically. As demand changes are therefore governed by substitution effects only, we expect a rising labor supply and a falling demand for children. The increase in labor supply, however, is associated with a move to a higher marginal tax rate, which reduces the price of a child. Moreover, as the additional wage income is spent on consumption, the marginal utility of consumption falls, which reduces utility losses from costs associated with increasing fertility. Simulation examples in Appendix B (electronic supplementary material) show that the sum of the two indirect effects that increase fertility may both be weaker or stronger than the depressing effect of the direct price increase.
In a second step, the child benefit is raised or reduced in order to reach again the initial number of children. At given demand for leisure, labor supply moves in the opposite direction. Both this labor supply reaction and the changed expenditure on child benefits require adapting the tax rate parameter in the direction of the change in the child benefit. Thus, either higher benefits go along with lower labor supply, requiring higher tax rates, or reduced benefits are accompanied by higher labor supply, causing lower tax rates. Again, there is no redistribution across households in equilibrium. The difference between taxes paid and child benefits received is unchanged when all households react in an identical fashion. If the price of a child is reduced due to a rising child benefit, the initial price of a child is already achieved before the marginal tax rate reaches its initial level. The new equilibrium is associated with a smaller marginal tax rate. Due to the absence of redistribution across households, the labor supply decision will be driven by a substitution effect according to the new price of leisure. As this price lies lower than in the initial situation, labor supply and consumption will increase, while leisure falls.
Since the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure does not coincide with the marginal rate of transformation, moving the relative price closer to the marginal rate of transformation carries the potential of a welfare increase. This suspicion is confirmed by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Any increase of the share of individual taxation α with additional changes in the child benef it β and the tax rate parameter t so as to keep fertility constant and the government budget balanced increases welfare.
Proof From Proposition 1, we know that dl/dα < 0. The stabilization policy concerning fertility and net tax revenue implies that in any equilibrium with identical households, c + wl = constant (16) holds true. Therefore, welfare changes according to
if the number of children remains constant. Using the first-order condition governing the demand for leisure (Eq. 5), we arrive at
Proposition 2 is easily understood. The policy experiment consists again of simultaneously increasing the share of individual taxation and varying both the child benefit and the marginal tax rate parameter so as to keep the government budget balanced and to induce unchanged fertility. Proposition 1 has established that this policy reduces the demand for leisure while keeping the net tax constant. Since the demand for leisure was distorted upward in the initial allocation, its reduction implies a welfare gain.
Family splitting
Family splitting can be perceived as a goal-directed instrument to support families and to increase birth rates. Our model can easily be used to analyze the impact of a move from simple joint taxation toward family splitting. In order to do so, we redefine some basic variables and functions. First of all, the tax of the household is written as
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the children splitting factor. An increase in γ represents a transition from couple-oriented income splitting toward family splitting. Since with φ 11 = 0 a change in γ has no direct impact on the marginal tax rate, φ 11 > 0 is assumed in this section. The direct effect of an increase in γ on the tax burden is given by
is the marginal tax rate of the household. Since under a progressive tax schedule the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate, an increase in γ reduces the tax burden of the family at a given tax parameter t. Furthermore, a move toward family splitting also reduces the marginal tax rate at given t, since
With family splitting, the net price of a child is
If γ > 0, the net price of a child under a family splitting scheme falls short of p − β + kψ because according to the tax formula additional children reduce the family's tax burden.
Comparing the analysis to the previous section, there are only two changes. The definition of the net price of a child is modified, and the individual taxation factor α is replaced by the family splitting factor γ . The optimality conditions on the household level are still given by Eqs. (4) and (5), and the equilibrium conditions for the government are analogous to Eqs. (11) and (12). However, since the net price of a child has changed, the expressions describing the impact of a change in the parameter γ on leisure and the marginal tax rate look slightly different. Nevertheless, family splitting has a likewise beneficial impact on leisure and welfare, as summarized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Any increase of the children splitting factor γ with additional changes in the child benef it β and the tax rate parameter t so as to keep fertility constant and the government budget balanced reduces demand for leisure and the marginal tax rate of the household, and increases both labor supply and demand for consumption goods. Welfare at the new equilibrium will be higher.
Proof See Appendix C in electronic supplementary material.
Family splitting reduces the marginal tax rate just as individual taxation does. At the same time, the direct impact on the price of a child is ambiguous. First, the reduction of the marginal income tax increases the price of a child via a higher opportunity cost. Second, raising the children splitting factor increases the tax saving factor γ /(2 + γ n), which reduces the price of a child. Third, the impact on the difference between the marginal tax rate and the average tax rate, ∂ T/∂ y 1 − T(y 0 , y 1 )/(y 0 + y 1 ), is ambiguous. It will be negative and thus increase the price of a child if the degree of progressivity, as measured by φ 11 , is not too large.
Hence, before adaptation of t and β, labor supply tends to increase, while fertility may move in either direction. At given fertility, a rising labor supply increases the marginal income tax, which reduces the opportunity cost of a child. Spending the additional income on consumption reduces the marginal utility of consumption and therefore also the utility loss associated with a given price of a child. Finally, as the difference between marginal tax and average tax rate increases, the price of a child is reduced through a higher tax saving.
While it would be necessary to increase the tax parameter t to balance the budget at unchanged behavior, the rising labor supply works in the opposite direction. It turns out that labor supply is also higher in the new equilibrium and the overall effect on the marginal tax rate is negative. As in the case of moving toward individual taxation, increasing the family splitting factor raises welfare because it reduces the distortion on labor supply.
Concluding discussion
Our analysis has demonstrated that joint taxation is inferior to both individual taxation and family tax splitting in a homogenous household environment for a fairly general framework of income tax schedules and utility functions. Among all tax schemes being considered, joint taxation is associated with the lowest labor supply and the highest marginal tax rate on the earnings of the wife. As in our policy experiments the number of and the time spent with children remain constant, where consumption increases, children's utility will presumably also increase. Even if children suffered from the reduction of their mother's leisure, they would typically be compensated by higher consumption according to the household utility function.
An obvious question is how the case in favor of replacing joint taxation by individual taxation can be made in an environment with heterogeneous households. The task is far from easy because changes in the structure of taxation will be associated with distributional consequences. Therefore, achieving a Pareto improvement sometimes requires additional measures to correct such distributional impacts.
The first possibility is that households are differentiated according to the exogenous income, being interpreted as wage income of the primary earner. Richer households face a higher marginal tax under joint taxation for any given labor supply of the secondary earner. As substitution and income effects work in the same direction, we may expect that fertility is higher and labor supply is lower if the exogenous income y 0 is higher. Moving from joint taxation to individual taxation tends to harm rich and help poor households at unchanged behavior. Neutralizing the distributional impact may therefore imply to use tax allowances rather than uniform child benefits.
A second scenario arises when considering households with differences in the wife's wage rate. When changing this wage rate, income and substitution effects work in opposite directions. Hence, there is no theoretical prediction in which direction labor supply and fertility will react. The empirically relevant case seems to consist in dominating substitution effects, where wives with a higher wage rate work more and have less children. Moving from joint taxation to individual taxation at unchanged behavior will then redistribute from the poor to the rich. This is a consequence of the fact that joint taxation reduces the tax load particularly strong when the two incomes are quite uneven. At the same time, again at unchanged behavior, a uniform child benefit would redistribute income from rich to poor families.
Finally, we may consider households that are differentiated with respect to the number of children. Couples may have decided against births or simply cannot have children. We suppose that households without children typically display both a higher demand for pure leisure and a higher labor supply. While a move toward individual taxation tends to harm families due to a more uneven distribution of individual incomes, the distributional consequences of a possibly increasing child benefit work in the opposite direction.
Moving from joint taxation to a family tax splitting scheme has analogous consequences. The change is particularly beneficial for richer households with either a higher primary or secondary income. In both cases, the redistributional impact will typically be partially compensated by an increase in the tax parameter and a cut of tax allowances. People without children are harmed by moving to family tax splitting but may benefit from a cut of child benefits.
Summing up, the argument against joint taxation will, with some modifications, presumably carry over to several generalizations with differentiated households. At the same time, it is clear that a Pareto improving transition from joint taxation to either an individualized system or family tax splitting becomes impossible in environments with differences in several dimensions if asymmetric information prevails across all dimensions.
An interesting question left open for future research lies in the comparison of individual taxation and family tax splitting at the maximum child factor. It is not obvious whether these two schemes can also be ranked by employing our methodology. Individual taxation tends to offer the strongest incentive for labor supply of the secondary earner by imposing a heavy tax load on the wage of the primary earner. On the other hand, considering a convex combination of both schemes and increasing the share of individual taxation can increase rather than decrease the marginal income tax before adapting the tax parameter and the child benefit. Such a surprising reaction may occur if both labor supply and fertility are high. Hence, though our simulations currently suggest the superiority of the individualized scheme, it cannot be excluded that the ranking of the two tax regimes ultimately depends on the specification of the utility function.
